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POLITICAL FORCES IN EASTERN GALICIA AND  
VOLHYNIA BEFORE WORLD WAR II

Description

A study of the relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians of Eastern Volhynia and Galicia, especially from 1918 to 1939, and an analysis of the political forces at work in this area.

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# EASTERN GALICIA AND VOLHYNIA

- I PROVINCE OF LWOW (LVOV)
- II PROVINCE OF STANISLAWOW (STANISLAV)
- III PROVINCE OF TARNOPOL
- IV PROVINCE OF VOLHYNIA





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SUMMARY

This study deals with one of the most hotly contested areas on earth, which during the last two hundred years has known at least six different governments. An attempt has been made to show the political forces at work in this territory, especially during the period between the two world wars, and to indicate the factors that favored, respectively, Poland, Germany, and the USSR.

The Western Ukrainian territories of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia have been under foreign domination since the fourteenth century. Polish domination over these territories was interrupted by the partitions of Poland, which placed Eastern Galicia under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Volhynia was under the Tsar. Under the Austrians the position of the Ukrainians was difficult, as the former intended to support the dominant class of Polish landowners, who attempted to keep the Ukrainians in full subjection. Nevertheless, in the two decades before the first World War Ukrainian cultural development was rapid in Eastern Galicia, and the area became a center of Ukrainian nationalism. In contrast, the Ukrainians of Volhynia and the other parts of the Russian Ukraine suffered; only after the Revolution of 1905 were they allowed any semblance of national culture. In general the Russian authorities were in league with the Poles of Eastern Galicia to restrain the Ukrainian nationalists.

At the close of the first World War the Ukrainians set up independent governments in Kiev and Lvov, which merged under pressure from the Poles and from the Soviet forces. For a time in 1920 the Ukrainians under Petlura joined with Pilsudski's Polish forces to conquer the Ukraine from the Bolsheviks, but were beaten back. By the Treaty of Riga in 1921 the Poles were granted possession of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, and Ukrainian hopes for an independent state were disappointed. The Poles took a strong stand against the Ukrainian demands for autonomy, and attempted to Polonize them, although the Ukrainians were in a majority in all four provinces, except possibly the province of Lvov. The Poles refused to permit the Ukrainians to attend the University of Lvov or to have one of their own, and succeeded in closing many of the Ukrainian elementary schools. They also tried to make the Ukrainians abandon the rites of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in favor of the rites of the Roman Catholic

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Church. In addition, they followed a policy of officially encouraged colonization of Polish settlers in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, although the Ukrainian peasants were poverty-stricken and badly needed the land.

From 1919 to 1926 the Ukrainians followed a policy of opposing the Poles in hope of getting support from the Allied powers. They agitated actively at Geneva, and boycotted the Polish elections. The Allied recognition of the Treaty of Riga, however, ended this policy, and caused the Ukrainian nationalists to turn more and more toward Soviet Russia, where the Ukrainians appeared to be enjoying greater freedom and economic success. Between 1926 and 1930 the tension between Poles and Ukrainians grew stronger, with arrests, assassinations, colonization of Poles, and closing of Ukrainian schools widely practiced.

The pro-Soviet orientation of the Ukrainians was brought to an end by the Soviet campaign against Ukrainian nationalism that began about 1930, as well as by the economic suffering in the Ukraine produced by the efforts to collectivize the peasants. The Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Galicia turned sharply away from the USSR, and, when the "pacification" instituted by the Poles showed the futility of Ukrainian violence against the Polish rulers, came to an agreement with the latter. The dominant UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union) allied itself with the Polish government, and dropped its agitation for autonomy. The Polish-German non-aggression pact signed in 1934 strengthened this attitude, as there was no longer hope that Germany would overthrow the Polish regime. From this time on the Ukrainian extremists, organized in the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), directed their terrorist campaign against the USSR with the backing of both Poles and Germans. The Poles, however, continued their campaign against the local Ukrainian nationalism, and Ukrainian bitterness against the Poles remained.

After 1930 a new factor made its appearance in the area in the form of the Sel-Rob Union, a left-wing union of peasants and workers allied with the Communist Party. Although the Polish government arrested many members of these groups, and banned the Communist Party in 1931, and the Sel-Rob Union in 1932, these two groups continued to exist in secret, and apparently gained considerable influence among the working population, which continued to look with favor on the USSR.

The position of the Jews of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia was made difficult in the late 1930's. The Polish government was becoming increasingly anti-Semitic, and imposed a number of economic and political burdens upon the Jews. The Ukrainian nationalists, many of whom were strongly influenced by Nazi propaganda, were also strongly anti-Semitic. Thus, although the great majority of the Jews either supported the Polish government or believed in Zionism, they were threatened both by the Poles and by the Ukrainian nationalists.

POLITICAL FORCES IN EASTERN GALICIA AND VOLHYNIA  
BEFORE WORLD WAR II

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Independent Galician-Volhynian State 1/

Galicia (Halichina), originally one of the principalities of the Kievan state, became independent when the power of Kiev crumbled in the late eleventh century. Under Roman and his son Daniel in the thirteenth century it became densely populated and prosperous, with considerable trade on the Dnestr river. The city of Halich, and Lvov, which was built by Daniel, were flourishing centers, where the native Ukrainian culture mingled with the Latin influences from the west. In the fourteenth century, however, the dynasty died out, and the kingdom became a bone of contention among Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania. 2/

B. Eastern Galicia Under Polish Domination (1340-1569)

Although Eastern Galicia was temporarily annexed by Casimir the Great of Poland in 1340, it did not come definitely under Polish rule until 1387, one year after the marriage of Jadwiga of Poland and Jagiello of Lithuania. Eastern Galicia, administered by the Poles as a separate entity officially termed the "Ruskio Wojewodstwo" (Ruthenian Palatinate), remained under Polish sovereignty until 1772.

Eastern Galicia, now linked with the dynamic Polish state, was the area toward which the Poles directed their first efforts toward expansion, their colonization and their political and religious penetration. The Polish kings were very generous in granting land in Eastern Galicia to the Polish gentry. The native

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1/ In this report, place names and the names of individuals have been spelled either in the Russian or the Ukrainian manner, rather than in the Polish fashion.

2/ Hrushevsky, M., Istoriya Ukraini-Rusi (History of Ukraine-Rus), Lvov and Kiev, 1898-1937, 10 vols.



Ukrainian gentry became a minority and were soon absorbed by the Polish colonists. In 1434 the administration and jurisprudence of Eastern Galicia were brought into line with the rest of Poland, and the Galician nobility received numerous privileges as noblemen of Poland. 1/

C. Volhynia Under Lithuanian Rule (1340-1569)

The Lithuanian occupation of Volhynia, like the occupation of other Ukrainian lands by the Lithuanians, was not a conquest or invasion. It was a peaceful consolidation of the land, and the maintenance of the "old order" was a matter of principle. The Lithuanian princes looked upon themselves as heirs to the old Kievan State. They made Ukrainian the language of their court and of their administration; they were members of the Russian Orthodox Church, like their Ukrainian subjects. 2/

D. Eastern Galicia-Volhynia under Polish Sovereignty (1569-1772)

In 1569, a Union was formed between Poland and Lithuania at Lublin. Volhynia became part of that Greater Poland, 3/ which for a time reached from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and thus the Ukrainian territories of Galicia and Volhynia were reunited under one government.

The principle of religious liberty was guaranteed by law, but the Roman Catholic Poles tried to force not only their language but their religion upon the Orthodox Lithuanians and Ukrainians. The process of Polonization and Romanization proved an utter failure as regards the Ukrainian masses; but it succeeded with the land-owning nobility. 4/

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1/ Hrushevsky, op. cit., V, 313.

2/ Ibid., IV, p. 19, pp. 95-96.

3/ Halecki, Oskar, Przylaczenie Podlasia, Wolynia i Kijowszczyzny do Korony w r. 1569 (Integration of Polesie, Volhynia, and Kiev with the crown in 1569), Krakow, 1915, pp. 170-173.

4/ Dorozhenko, D. V., History of the Ukraine, p. 129.

As the princes and nobles accepted the Roman Catholic faith, the importance of the Orthodox Church diminished, and it became the church of the lower classes. In 1560 the Jesuits came to Poland and their schools were spread all over Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia. The younger generation among the Ukrainian-Lithuanian aristocracy were generally converted to the Roman Catholic Church and educated by the Jesuits. In the middle of the sixteenth century the Orthodox Church presented a spectacle of decadence. 1/

In 1596 the Church Council at Brest, called together by Catholic clergy who hoped to pave the way for merging the Orthodox Church in Russia with the Catholic Church, proposed a Union of the Orthodox Church of the Ukraine with Catholicism. The Union, which permitted the Ukrainians to retain their ritual and their married priesthood and gave concurring Ukrainian bishops all the privileges of the Catholic hierarchy, was accepted by the bishops. Fierce opposition on the part of Ukrainian gentry and peasants, however, prevented the Union from becoming complete. As a result the Orthodox of the Ukraine henceforth formed two groups: the Uniates, who accepted Papal authority, and the Orthodox, who looked to the Russian Orthodox Church. 2/ During this struggle over the Union, the Orthodox Church became somewhat rejuvenated.

In the seventeenth century the Cossacks, frontiersmen centered around the lowland community (Sich) at the rapids of the Dnepr, came to the fore. They detested the oppression of the Polish landlords, and were bitterly hostile to the Union of Brest. Under the able and popular Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky (1648) they

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1/ Allen, W. E. D., The Ukraine, pp. 84-85.

2/ Hrushevsky, op. cit., V, 584-586; "Religious Questions in Poland," Polish Fortnightly Review, 1 January 1944.

defeated the Poles in a war of national and social liberation. Khmelnitsky and his followers, however, realized that the Ukraine was too weak to stand alone, and put themselves under the protection of Moscow by signing an agreement at Pereyslav in 1654. 1/

All hope of Ukrainian independence soon disappeared. In spite of the promise of autonomy to the Ukrainians, the Tsars soon extended full sway over their Ukrainian subjects. Moreover, as the Tsars were too weak to gain the whole Ukraine, they, together with the Poles, partitioned it by the treaty of Andrusovo in 1667; the left bank of the Dnepr became Russian territory, while that part of Ukraine on the right bank fell to Poland. 2/

E. Eastern Galicia Under Austria (1772-1914)

By the first partition of Poland in 1772, Eastern Galicia came under Austrian rule. The lot of the Ukrainians did not become a happy one, as their region was combined with purely Polish territory to form the province of Galicia, which was administered by Polish officials, who attempted to prevent the development of Ukrainian culture and national feeling. The Polish landlords of Eastern Galicia, moreover, retained their power over the Ukrainian peasantry, whom they ruled with an iron hand.

In 1848 Count Stadion of Austria, fearing the Poles and Hungarians, encouraged the Ukrainians to oppose their local masters by promising to divide Galicia into a Polish and a Ukrainian section, to use the Ukrainian language in the schools of the eastern part, and to emancipate the Ukrainian peasants from the Polish landlords. 3/

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1/ Hrushevsky, op. cit., Vols. VII, VIII, and IX.

2/ Hrushevsky, The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem, p. 24.

3/ Hrushevsky, M., A History of Ukraine, New Haven, 1941, pp. 489-490.



As soon as the Revolution of 1848 was suppressed, however, Count Stadion dropped the promised reforms, except for the legal abolition of serfdom.

1. The Domination of the Poles. After the Revolution of 1848, the Poles gained new power in Eastern Galicia, and in 1873 made a secret compact with the Austrians which assured local Polish supremacy. 1/ The Ukrainians were barred from all important offices, and the election of representatives to the Reichsrat in Vienna was subject to very heavy pressure, attended by much corruption. As a result, until the election reform of 1907 the Ukrainians elected only seven members, while the Poles elected some seventy members. 2/

The Poles also used the schools to further their nationalist aims. While the study of Polish was nominally optional, in effect it was compulsory, and the teachers were enjoined to pay particular attention to this subject. Of the 5,391 elementary schools in Galicia, 2,457 were Ukrainian, and 2,909 Polish. 3/

2. The University Question. The University of Lvov was another cause of friction. In 1871 the Poles succeeded in having Polish and Ukrainian adopted in place of German as the languages of instruction, and proceeded to fill the professorial posts with Polish professors, with the exception of two chairs reserved for Ukrainians. They even tried to gain control of these.

In 1901 the rising Ukrainian nationalism produced an open conflict. On 1 December of that year all the Ukrainian students left the University of Lvov and went to various Austrian universities. This move had repercussions in the Reichsrat, and even in the German Reichstag. 4/ The Austrian government

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1/ Fedorchuk, Yaroslav, The Position of the Ukrainians in Galicia, p. 54.

2/ Hrushevsky, M., The Ukrainian Revival, p. 31.

3/ Fedorchuk, op. cit., p. 55.

4/ "Die Ruthenen und ihre Goenner in Berlin," Die Grenzboten, 1902, pp. 57-62.

declared its readiness to establish a Ukrainian university in Lvov, but the Polish students and the Senate of the University, as well as the Lvov City Council, refused to permit it. During demonstrations in 1906-1907, a Ukrainian student was killed, whereupon three hundred Ukrainian students were arrested; not a single Pole was seized. The struggle between the national groups continued until 1914, 1/ and flared up again under Polish rule after the World War.

3. The Agrarian Question. The agrarian population -- 76.9 percent of the inhabitants of Galicia according to the census of 1890 -- presented a grave problem. The average peasant holding of 2-3 acres (3-5 morgs) was too small to support a family, so that the peasants had to seek work on the estates of the landlords. Wages ranged from 15 to 57 kreutzers (7½ to 28½ cents) a day without board; the rates tended to be lower in Eastern Galicia than in the Polish part of the province. Agitation for higher pay was strongly repressed; when a strike broke out in 1902 in Eastern Galicia, the laborers were chained and imprisoned for months, and then fined. 2/

4. The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement. In 1894 the leading Ukrainian historian, Dr. Hrushevsky, came to the University of Lvov from Kiev. An ardent Ukrainian nationalist, he lectured in Ukrainian, and his historical seminar gave inspiration to a number of Ukrainian scholars. In 1898 he became head of the Shevchonko Scientific Society, which had been established in 1873. Under his leadership it became an unofficial academy of arts and sciences, devoted to Ukrainian history, culture, and learning. It published a general bulletin, as well as twenty-two scientific periodicals. 3/

In spite of the efforts of the Poles, the Ukrainians kept alive their language in official usage, in the church, in the schools, and in the University of Lvov. A network of

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1/ Mudryj, Wasyl, Borotba za ohnyszcze ukrainskoj kultury w zachidnych zemlach Ukrainy (The struggle for a center of Ukrainian culture in the western lands of the Ukraine), Lvov, 1923, pp. 30-71.

2/ Feldman, Wilhelm, Stronnictwo i Programy Polityczne w Galicji 1846-1906 (Parties and Political Programs in Galicia, 1846-1906), Krakow, 2 vols., 1907, I, 236.

3/ Paprocki, S. J., Minority Affairs and Poland, Warsaw, 1935, p. 8.



associations such as Sich (named after the early Cossack community) and Prosvita (Enlightenment) covered the country, spreading popular education and organizing community services, amateur theatricals, and choral groups. 1/

Moreover, the Ukrainians began to gain some political influence. After the election reform of 1907 they succeeded in electing twenty-eight deputies to the Reichsrat from Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, who agitated for a Ukrainian university at Lvov, for some measure of autonomy for the Ukrainian territories, and for local electoral reforms. 2/

5. Repercussions in Russia. To the thirty million Ukrainians in Russia, the Ukrainian nationalist movement had considerable significance. For these Ukrainians, who were forbidden to use their native tongue as a literary medium, or in sermons, speeches, and plays, Eastern Galicia became a sort of intellectual Piedmont. Ukrainian books published in Lvov were smuggled across the Russian border, while exiles from Russia found refuge in Eastern Galicia. In 1890 Dragomanov, a prominent exiled professor, founded the Ukrainian Radical Party of Eastern Galicia, which aimed to reorganize Austria on the basis of federalism and autonomy for ethnic groups. This event marked the beginning of a real democratic movement among the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia. 3/

In the Russian Ukraine, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, a political party similar to Dragomanov's party in Eastern Galicia, was founded in 1900. It published a pamphlet, Samostina Ukraina. (Independent Ukraine), giving the historical claims for Ukrainian independence. The Party was headed by a Central Committee and a Foreign Committee in Lvov. It published two newspapers and a series of pamphlets, which had a considerable illicit circulation among the intellectuals of the Russian Ukraine. 4/

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1/ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

2/ Cegielskij, Longin, "Ukrainian Aspirations in Austria," Ukraine's Claim to Freedom, p. 64.

3/ Pollock, Simon O., "The Misrule of the Polish Aristocracy," loc. cit., p. 77.

4/ Doroshenko, W., "The Political Parties in Russia," loc. cit., p. 101.



The Russian authorities, alarmed by the rise of Ukrainian nationalism, which threatened the Great Russian dream of "Russia -- one and indivisible," looked for allies against the movement. They found them in the Polish rulers of Eastern Galicia, and among those Ukrainians who were known as the so-called "Moscalophiles" or "Russophiles." The latter, a conservative, reactionary clerical element, preferred Polish to Ukrainian schools, Polish culture to their own. They were very valuable to the Poles as allies against the Ukrainian nationalist movement. In 1902, for example, they tried to keep the peasants from striking against the Polish land-owners. 1/

While the Russophiles were not strong enough to defeat the Ukrainian nationalists in the local elections, 2/ they did hinder the constructive work of the Ukrainian national groups. The influence of the latter was countered by a Russophile equivalent of the Prosvita, which opened reading-rooms in many parts of southern Galicia, established 3/ a wealthy charitable Institute, and endowed the two seats in the University held by Russophiles. 4/ In Russia, the Russian-Galician Benevolent Association, with branches in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa, collected funds for the Galician Russophiles, who were also aided by the Association of Slavonic Benevolence, a vigorous politico-ecclesiastical organization, under the Pan-Slavist Count Vladimir Bobrinsky. 5/

6. The New Polish Policy. For the Poles the alliance with the Russophiles was a new tactic, whose chief advocate was Roman Dmowski, leader of the National Democrats. Dmowski had always regarded Germany as the greatest enemy of Poland. While in the Russian Duma, he had come to an understanding with the Pan-Slavist Count Bobrinsky. In return for Polish support for the Russophiles in Eastern Galicia, Bobrinsky was to seek concessions for the Poles in Russian Poland. Dmowski, Bobrinsky, and some of the

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1/ Hrushevsky, M., "The Ukrainian Revival," loc. cit., p. 33.

2/ Butler, Ralph, The New Eastern Europe, New York, 1919, p. 139.

3/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 93.

4/ Butler, op. cit., p. 141.

5/ Raffalovich, George, The Russians in Galicia, New York, 1916, p. 7.

Galician Russophiles participated in the Neo-Slav Congress in Prague in 1908. 1/

Another move to suppress Ukrainian nationalism was a secret pact between the Poles headed by Count Potocki, Governor of Galicia, and Stolypin, Russian Prime Minister. 2/ Potocki, known as "Iron Hand" for his ruthless suppression of the Ukrainian peasant strikes, persecuted the Sich and, together with the Russian Government, supported the Russophile candidates in the Reichsrat elections of 1907. Because of electoral fraud, these candidates won two seats. Potocki also denounced the Ukrainian movement to the Austrian government as being pro-Russian and hostile to the Austrian Empire. This charge aroused the bitter indignation of the Ukrainian nationalists, and in 1908 Potocki was shot by a Ukrainian student. 3/

In spite of open and covert opposition, however, Ukrainian national consciousness was steadily growing in Eastern Galicia. It remained to be seen, however, whether the Ukrainians would be able to strike for national liberty when the moment came.

#### F. Eastern Galicia in World War I (1914-1917)

The first weeks of the war, which aligned Ukrainians against Ukrainians, gave no opportunity for an uprising. Then in September 1914 the Russian "liberators" poured into the province, and the pro-Polish governor, Sheremetev, was soon replaced by Governor General Yuri Bobrinsky, who set out to Russify Eastern Galicia. He stated his position as follows:

"I consider Lemberg [Lvov] and Eastern Galicia the real cradle of Great Russia, since the original population was Russian. The reorganization will be based on Russian ideals.

All social and political organizations must be discontinued and may resume their activities only by permission.

These precepts obtain only in East Galicia; West Galicia will be treated differently. 4/

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1/ Butler, op. cit., p. 142.

2/ Pollock, Simon O., "The Misrule of the Polish Aristocracy," Ukraine's Claim to Freedom, p. 83. The semi-official Novoye Vremya of St. Petersburg confirmed the existence of this agreement.

3/ Ukraine's Claim to Freedom, pp. 89-90.

4/ Evening Telegram, New York, 30 September 1914; Cf. "The Czar's Rule in Galicia, 1914," Ukraine's Claim to Freedom, p. 114.



In line with this policy, thousands of Ukrainian patriots and intellectuals were exiled to Russia and Siberia. 1/

The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church also tried to Russify the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia by forcing Orthodoxy upon them. The fanatical Bishop Evlogii of Volhynia was put in charge. He looked on the province as an Orthodox land where the Union with Rome had been artificially introduced, and proceeded to install Orthodox clergy in place of the Uniate clergy, many of whom (among them Metropolitan Count Sheptitsky) were exiled to Russia and Siberia. 2/

The Russians also attempted to use economic measures to win over the peasants, many of whom had been ruined by the war. Count Vladimir Bobrinsky's Central Relief Committee provided funds for those in need. In addition, it was proposed to parcel out the land of absentee landowners, most of whom had fled to Vienna, and shift the tax burden from the peasant to the landowner. While these were clever gestures, they were never carried out. 3/

When in 1915 the Austrians regained Eastern Galicia to the Strypa and Zlota Lipa rivers, many of the Russophile peasants went with them in hope of getting land in Russia. In this aim they were badly disappointed, and gained only the hatred and scorn of the peasants of the frontier villages.

The Russian attempt to uproot Ukrainian nationalism in Eastern Galicia did not succeed, for it was far from crushed, and in 1917-1918 the Ukrainians were able to strike for liberty.

#### G. Volhynia Under Russian Rule

Volhynia was under Russian control since the late eighteenth century. Here the Russians, who regarded the Ukrainians as a

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1/ Raffalovich, op. cit., p. 10.

2/ Attwater, Donald, "The Ukrainian Church and Its Leader," Irish Quarterly Review, December 1939, p. 579.

3/ Raffalovich, op. cit., pp. 14-17.



branch of the Russian people, discouraged the use of their language and rigidly repressed Ukrainian nationalism. 1/ The official attitude was stated by Count Valuyev, Minister of Interior in 1863: "There never has existed, there does not exist, and there never can exist a Little Russian Ukrainian language and nationality." 2/

The Russian Orthodox Church also played an important role in combatting Ukrainian nationalism in Volhynia. It banned all rites peculiar to the Ukraine, and, after the rise of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, ruthlessly suppressed the Uniate Church, with the help of the Russian government. The Uniates were forced to accept conversion to Orthodoxy. 3/ To counteract the Ukrainian nationalism of Eastern Galicia, the Pan-Slavists created a center of irredentist propaganda in the Pochayev monastery in Volhynia; it became the goal of organized pilgrimages of Russophiles from Eastern Galicia. The Orthodox seminaries of Volhynia, moreover, opened their doors to the sons of Russophile Galician clergy. 4/

The Revolution of 1905 resulted in permission to publish newspapers in the Ukrainian tongue; by autumn of that year there were already thirty-four Ukrainian publications. Moreover, the first Duma (Parliament) had sixty-three Ukrainian members, most of them from Volhynia and neighboring provinces. They demanded land and Ukrainian autonomy much as Dragomanov had done. 5/ The Duma, however, failed to produce significant changes in these respects.

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1/ Chyz, Jaroslaw, and Roucek, J. S., "Ukrainian Sociology: Its Development to 1914," Journal of Central European Affairs, April 1941, p. 75; Rudnyckyj, Stefan, Ukraina und die Ukrainer, Berlin, 1915, pp. 14-15.

2/ Butler, op. cit., p. 32.

3/ Hrushevsky, M., The Historical Evolution of the Ukrainian Problem, London, 1915, p. 34; Halecki, Oskar, "Polish-Russian Relations -- Past and Present," The Review of Politics, vol. 5, No. 3, p. 325, note 1.

4/ Butler, op. cit., p. 140.

5/ Hoetsch, Otto, "The Ukrainian Movement in Russia," Ukraine's Claim to Freedom, p. 95-96.

The Volhynians were also subject to Russian educational influence. Whereas the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia in 1914 had their own schools, and held nine chairs at the University of Lvov, the Volhynians were forced to attend Russian schools and were thoroughly Russified. It was not until 1916 that the first Ukrainian schools were set up in the province by the Austrian occupation authorities. The first teachers were mostly Ukrainian soldiers. This helped to stimulate nationalism in Volhynia. 1/

H. The Western Ukrainian Republic (November 1918)

Soon after the beginning of the war Ukrainian patriots from Russia made their way to Vienna, where with Austrian support they founded the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine and helped to organize a "Ukrainian Sich Legion." 2/ The League advocated full independence for the Russian Ukraine, and self-determination for Eastern Galicia. Its relations with the Ukrainian Reichsrat members were cool; no Austrian Ukrainian joined its executive committee. The Austrian General Staff used some of its members for secret service work in the Balkans, which did not improve the League's reputation. Eventually the Austrians seem to have dropped it; the German General Staff later used the League to organize propaganda among Ukrainian prisoners taken from the Russian Army. 3/

The Ukrainian Sich Legion played a minor role; the Central Powers limited it to two thousand men; while they permitted the Polish Legions to have as many men as possible. 4/

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire gave the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia their chance. On 10 October 1918 the Ukrainian members of the Reichsrat met and issued a summons

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1/ Lewyckij, Dmytso, "Die ukrainische Frage," Nation und Staat, December, 1927, pp. 273-275; Rappaport, Jakob, "Die historischen und soziologischen Grundlagen der ukrainischen Frage in Polen," ibid., April 1929, p. 452.

2/ Grigoryiw, N., Ukrainska Borotba za Derzawu w rokach 1917-1920 (The Ukrainian Struggle for Statehood in 1917-1920), Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1934, p. 3; Butler, op. cit., p. 148.

3/ Butler, op. cit., p. 148, note 1.

4/ Ibid., p. 148, note 1(a); Revyuk, Emil, Polish Atrocities in Ukraine, New York, 1934, p. 94.



for a conference of Ukrainian delegates. The conference met at Lvov on 18 October 1918, and elected a Ukrainian National Rada (Council) headed by Dr. Evhen Petrushevich, to act as constituent assembly for the Western Ukraine. On 19 October 1918 the Rada proclaimed an independent Western Ukrainian Republic, comprising all the Ukrainian territory of Austria-Hungary: Eastern Galicia, northwestern Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine. On 1 November a Ukrainian Military Command seized Lvov, and the Austrian governor of Galicia relinquished his power to the Rada, which had, as a matter of fact, already assumed it. 1/ The remaining towns were quickly seized, and in a few days the blue and yellow Ukrainian banner waved over most of the Western Ukraine.

The infant republic was not to enjoy peace, however, as the Poles, who claimed this area on the basis of possession before the partition of Poland, invaded it. On 21 November 1918 the Rada was forced to evacuate Lvov and retired to Tarnopol.

#### J. Union of Western and Eastern Ukraine

In the meantime, after the overthrow of the Tsar, a Rada had been established in Kiev under Professor Hrushevsky. Negotiations were begun with the Russian Provisional Government, which, dreading the loss of the vital food and industrial production of the Ukraine, refused the Rada's demands for Ukrainian autonomy. Finally, on 16 July 1917 the Kerensky government was obliged to concede autonomy. 2/

After the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia on 7 November 1917, the Rada declared the Ukraine free on 20 November 1917, although the door was left open for the creation of a federative Russian state, including an autonomous Ukraine. The Bolsheviks, who had considerable support in the area around Kharkov, attacked Kiev and with the help of many of the local workers drove out the Rada in January 1918. 3/ While the fighting was still in progress,

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1/ Hrushevsky, M., A History of Ukraine, pp. 552-553.

2/ Grigoryiw, op. cit., pp. 5-8.

3/ Chamberlin, W. H., The Ukraine, A Submerged Nation, New York, 1944, pp. 41-42.



the Rada issued a declaration of independence ("The Fourth Universale") on 22 January 1918. Shortly thereafter the Rada sent a delegation to the peace conference then in progress at Brest-Litovsk. The Central Powers, particularly the Austrians, were most willing to make a treaty with the Rada on 8 February 1918. The Ukraine agreed to furnish one million tons of food-stuffs; in return, Austria agreed to grant some autonomy to Eastern Galicia, and the Central Powers undertook to expel the Bolsheviks from the Ukraine. Hungry Vienna hailed the settlement as the Brotfriede. 1/

This treaty, and the subsequent occupation of the Ukraine by the forces of the Central Powers, offended the Entente and served as a major cause for denial of Allied recognition to the Ukrainian republic. 2/

German and Austrian forces soon drove the Red Army out of the Ukraine, and restored the Central Rada in Kiev. The Rada, however, soon found itself in conflict with the occupation forces, who felt that the liberal views of the Rada were a hindrance to full exploitation of the country. On 28 April the Germans dissolved the Rada and installed the reactionary Skoropadsky as "Hetman of the Ukraine." His government, backed by German bayonets, was hostile to Ukrainian nationalism, and served only the interests of the landowners and the German forces of occupation. 3/ When the German forces withdrew late in 1918 Skoropadsky escaped to Berlin, 4/ where at last reports he was living as a friend of Goering.

The triumphant Ukrainian nationalists set up a Directory headed by Vinnichenko and Petlura and sent aid to the hard-pressed government of the Western Ukrainian Republic, which was still fighting the Poles. On 22 January 1919 representatives of

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1/ Ibid., pp. 44-45; Mowat, R. B., A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925, New York, 1931, pp. 81-82.

2/ Schmidt, Axel, "Das ukrainische Problem," Volk und Reich, July-December 1933, p. 711; Riko, Jary, Ukraine von gestern und heute, p. 6.

3/ Grigoryiw, op. cit., pp. 14-17; Knupfer, George, "The Ukrainian Problem," Free Europe, London, 21 February 1941, pp. 143-164.

4/ Grigoryiw, p. 17; Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

the two Ukrainian bodies met at Kiev, and at the labor congress there proclaimed the establishment of a united, free Ukrainian National Republic, headed by Petlura's Directory. 1/

K. The Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919)

Late in 1918 the Poles, who had formed an army with considerable Allied aid, became active. Although the Allies helped them chiefly to fight the "Bolshevik menace," the Poles also turned against the poorly armed Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, and, as stated above, occupied Lvov in November 1918. The campaign was halted, however, at the command of the Supreme Allied Council of the Paris Peace Conference, which called for an armistice, pending a settlement. 2/ During the truce the Poles were reinforced by two Polish divisions under General Haller, consisting of volunteers from America and deserters from the German Army, trained and equipped by the French. Although the Allies forbade their use against the Ukrainians, the Poles again attacked the latter. The Polish advance was stopped only after the Allied leaders in Paris had threatened economic sanctions. 3/

At this point the Poles raised the Bolshevik bogey, declaring that the lives and property of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia were endangered by the invasion of "Bolshevik bands." By this phrase was meant the Ukrainians, since the Red Army did not come near the province at that time. As a result of this propaganda, on 25 June 1919 the Allies authorized the Poles to occupy the province, in spite of the protests of the Ukrainians. 4/

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1/ Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine, p. 554; Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

2/ Temperley, H. W. V., ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, 1920, I, 336.

3/ Soborny, V., and Bukata, W., The Truth About Poland, New York, 1938, p. 5.

4/ Temnickij, Wolodymir, and Buraczuskij, Joseph, Polish Atrocities in Ukrainian Galicia, New York, 1919, pp. 1-3; Temperley, op. cit., I, 336.

The Ukrainian cause was now everywhere in serious difficulties. Petlura's forces, which the Galician troops now joined, had been forced out of Kiev by the Bolsheviks, only two weeks after the Directory had been set up. The Directory's forces were moved from place to place in the Volhynia area. The Rumanians also added to the confusion by seizing Bukovina, which had aligned itself with Eastern Galicia. The success of Denikin and Wrangel in driving the Bolsheviks from the Russian Ukraine did little to aid the Ukrainian cause, as these leaders were Great Russian nationalists. In addition, the Ukrainian ranks were hard hit by typhus in the summer of 1919. As a result, at the end of 1919 Petlura and most of the Directory took refuge from the resurgent Red Army in territory controlled by the Poles and gave up claims to Galicia; Dr. Petrushevich of the Western Division (Galicia) of the Ukrainian Republic escaped to Rumania, and eventually settled in Vienna, <sup>1/</sup> where he intensified his efforts to win the sympathy of the Allied powers for the Ukrainians. The Poles, however, with French support, succeeded in undoing his work. When the Supreme Allied Council decided on 21 November 1919 that Poland was to hold Galicia, as a mandate only, for twenty-five years, Poland succeeded in having the proposal rejected. <sup>2/</sup>

L. The Campaign of Pilsudski and Petlura Against Soviet Russia, 1920

After it had become evident in 1919 that Petlura could not withstand the Red Army, he decided to seek support in Poland and Rumania, in spite of the protests of the Eastern Galician leaders. In December 1919 Petlura met Pilsudski in Warsaw. <sup>3/</sup> Pilsudski was eager to undertake his "Jagiellonian" program of a Polish empire similar in size to the huge medieval Polish-Lithuanian state. The Polish parties of the Left and much of the Center hoped that in return for liberation from the Bolshevik yoke Lithuania,

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<sup>1/</sup> Hrushevsky, M., A History of Ukraine, p. 555; Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 47-50.

<sup>2/</sup> Doroshenko, D., History of the Ukraine, Edmonton, Canada, 1939, p. 649.

<sup>3/</sup> Knupfer, George, "The Ukrainian Problem," Free Europe, London, 21 February 1941, p. 164.



White Russia, and the Ukraine would be glad to enter a federation under Polish leadership. 1/ This program was strongly opposed by Dmowski and the Right, including the National Democrats. Dmowski, still believing that Germany, not Russia, was Poland's greatest enemy, wished to reach an agreement with Russia over the boundary. 2/ Nevertheless, Pilsudski's nationalist slogans, which covered his hatred for Russia and his great ambitions, carried the day. On 21 April 1920 Petlura signed a treaty of peace with Poland, in which Poland recognized the Ukrainian National Republic; the latter renounced all claims to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. 3/

Pilsudski and Petlura advanced into the Ukraine on 28 April 1920, and by 8 May had taken Kiev. The Poles, however, had outdistanced their supplies, and moreover, failed to receive the support of the Ukrainians which Petlura had promised. Even though the peasant leader Makhno joined Petlura's forces with some two thousand men, the Ukrainian peasants showed no enthusiasm for the "Polish liberators." 4/ Apparently the Ukrainians had memories of earlier experiences with Polish landlords. Thus the Poles proved too weak to beat off the Red counteroffensive, which quickly swept to the gates of Warsaw, where they were stopped and beaten back by the Poles commanded by General Weygand and aided by French supplies. The Red Army was pushed rapidly back, and eventually the fighting ended when a preliminary peace was signed on 12 October 1920. 5/

#### M. The Treaty of Riga (1921)

The final settlement was made in March 1921. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic was one of the parties to the settlement, by which

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1/ Grabski, Stanislaw, The Polish-Soviet Frontier, New York, 1944, pp. 19-20.

2/ Dmowski, Roman, Polityka Polska i odbudowanie Panstwa Polskiego (Polish Policy and the Reconstruction of the Polish State), Warsaw, 1926, pp. 446-447, 487.

3/ Slocombe, George, A History of Poland, New York, 1939, pp. 311-312; Kutschabsky, W., "Die ukrainische politische Emigration," Osteuropa, May 1930, p. 530.

4/ Grabski, op. cit., p. 22; Oertzen, F. W., So This is Poland, London, 1932, p. 30.

5/ Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

Poland recovered the western part of Volhynia; Eastern Galicia was confirmed as a Polish possession. In return, Poland renounced her program for a federation to include all Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine. <sup>1/</sup>

The Allies refused to recognize this arrangement until 15 March 1923. The resulting unsettled status of Eastern Galicia encouraged the Ukrainians to hope that Allied intervention in their favor would secure them more rights in Eastern Galicia. As will be indicated subsequently, the unrest engendered by this hope inflamed Polish-Ukrainian relations, and finally plunged the Ukrainians into great disillusionment.

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<sup>1/</sup> Halecki, Oskar, "Polish-Russian Relations -- Past and Present," Review of Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 331-332.

## II. EASTERN GALICIA AND VOLHYNIA UNDER POLISH RULE

### A. Ethnic Factors

Eastern Galicia and Volhynia as united under Polish rule comprised an area of some 92,000 square kilometers. The Ukrainians, who were probably the largest ethnic group, consisted of the large group of Galicians and the similar Volhynians, as well as three groups of mountaineers in the Carpathians, who spoke local dialects. The Ukrainians were settled largely in the rural areas. The Poles were scattered throughout the area, with large concentrations in and around the cities of Lvov and Tarnopol. There were also some Jews, Czechs, and Germans.

It is exceedingly difficult to determine the relative strength of the Ukrainians and the Poles, as each side attempted to show that it was the predominant group. Moreover, the criteria for determining nationality were not always uniform; both linguistic and religious criteria were used in the Polish censuses of 1921 and 1931. The two censuses gave the following results:

| Province  | Polish population<br>in 1921 | Percentage<br>in 1921 | Population<br>claiming<br>Polish as<br>mother-<br>tongue, 1931 | Percentage<br>in 1931 |
|-----------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Lvov      | 1,554,824                    | 55.8                  | 1,812,363                                                      | 57.9                  |
| Tarnopol  | 554,775                      | 44.9                  | 793,924                                                        | 49.5                  |
| Stanislav | 273,494                      | 21.7                  | 332,015                                                        | 22.5                  |
| Volhynia  | 263,534                      | 16.8                  | 343,250                                                        | 16.5 <sup>1/</sup>    |

<sup>1/</sup> Krynski, Alfred, "The Polish and Non-Polish Populations of Poland," Instytut Spraw Narodowosciowych (Institute of Nationality Affairs), Warsaw, 1932, pp. 32-44.



According to the Polish census of 1931, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia had a Jewish population of 824,060, distributed as follows:

| <u>Province</u> | <u>Jewish inhabitants</u> | <u>Percent of total population</u> |
|-----------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Lvov            | 342,405                   | 10.9                               |
| Taropol         | 134,117                   | 8.7                                |
| Stanislav       | 139,746                   | 9.4                                |
| Volhynia        | 207,792                   | 10.0                               |

In the city of Lvov, Jews constituted 31.9 percent of the population in 1939. 1/

In addition, the area contained small numbers of Germans, Czechs, and other minority groups. 2/

In contrast to the official Polish figures, which doubtless made the number of Poles appear as large as possible, there stand the estimates of the Ukrainian ethnologist at the Jagiellonian University of Krakow, Dr. Kubiovich (later a Nazi collaborator). The following figures are probably for the year 1938: 3/

| <u>Province</u> | <u>Ukrainians</u> | <u>Poles</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Lvov            | 1,280,000         | 712,000      |
| Tarnopol        | 876,000           | 587,000      |
| Stanislav       | 1,083,000         | 240,000      |
| Volhynia        | 1,449,000         | 325,000      |

1/ American Jewish Committee, The Jews of Poland.

2/ Paprocki, S. J., Minority Affairs and Poland, p. 178.

3/ Ubrich, Richard, "Die Nationalitätenfrage in Polen," Nation und Staat, July-August, 1939, p. 644.

The statistician Krynski attributes the relatively more rapid increase in the number of Poles in Eastern Galicia to the higher birthrate of the Polish Catholics, Polish immigration caused by economic opportunities, and Ukrainian emigration after the World War, particularly to Canada. 1/ Undoubtedly, however, the official Polish policy of settling Polish colonists in these areas, which will be discussed below, had much to do with the rise of the Polish population.

B. The Greek Catholic (Uniate) and the Orthodox Churches

In eastern Europe religious adherence and nationality are often almost synonymous, so that religion often becomes an important political problem. The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia are largely Uniates (Greek Catholics). From 1900 to 1944 their Church was headed by Count Andrei Sheptitsky, Archbishop of Lvov, Metropolitan of Galicia, and Bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk, with jurisdiction also over the dioceses of Stanislav and Peremysl (Przemysl). 2/ Although Metropolitan Sheptitsky was a Pole by birth, he espoused the cause of the Ukrainians. The Greek Catholic clergy are Ukrainians, so that, in effect, this Church is really a Ukrainian national church. 3/

Metropolitan Sheptitsky, whose position was difficult because he had to take account of the Polish state and of the Papacy, nevertheless looked out for the Ukrainians and dominated a far from docile intelligentsia. One of his ambitions was to found a Ukrainian university at Lvov. As a first step he founded a museum there in 1913, with a library and archives. The Greek Catholic Academy of Theology at Lvov, organized upon the model of the Roman Catholic universities, was endowed by him.

On several occasions, the Metropolitan acted to protect the interests of his people. When two of his bishops, out of fear of

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1/ Krynski, Alfred, "The Polish and Non-Polish Populations in Poland," loc. cit., p. 63.

2/ Dziesieciolecie Polski Odrodzonej (A Decade of Polish Renaissance), Krakow, Warsaw, 1928, p. 365.

3/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 56.

Russia, wanted to bring the Greek Catholic Church into conformity with the Catholic Church through enforcing celibacy of the clergy and banning the Eastern liturgy, 1/ he discouraged this step, knowing that any attempt to Latinize the Church would be regarded by the Ukrainian peasants as an attempt to Polonize them. When the Polish government succeeded in having 114 Orthodox Churches closed in the summer of 1938, Metropolitan Sheptitsky expressed his indignation in pastoral letters. The resulting diplomatic conflict was only settled by a visit of a Papal Nuncio to the Metropolitan in December 1938. As a result of this meeting, the Polish government discontinued its policy of closing these churches. 2/ The Metropolitan showed the same determination and courage in defending his people against the Poles at the time of the "pacification" of the Ukrainians in 1938, 3/

In Volhynia, with a strongly Orthodox population, there was little religious difficulty. The people, who objected to the Russification of their Church under the Tsars, asked the Orthodox Synod of Poland for bishops of Ukrainian nationality, and demanded the use of the Ukrainian language in the Church service. Thanks to the completely loyal attitude of the Volhynian representatives in the Polish Diet, the Polish government proved helpful in aiding them to secure Ukrainian bishops in Kremenets and Lutsk. 4/

C. Eastern Galicia and Volhynia under Polish Rule (1919-1939)

1. 1919-May 1926. Resentment over the Ukrainian Polish War of 1918-1919 and Ukrainian hopes of Allied intervention prevented an understanding between the Polish government and the Ukrainians. They refused all compromises proposed by the Poles and boycotted

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1/ Lubienski, H. I., "Kosciol Greko-Katolicki w wojewodztwach poludniowo-wschodnich" (The Greek Catholic Church in the South-western Provinces), Sprawy Narodowosciowe (Nationality Affairs), No. 5-6, 1934, p. 542.

2/ Laeuen, Harold, "Polen nach dem Wiener Schniedspruch," Osteuropa, January 1939, p. 260; Sprawy Narodowosciowe, No. 1-2, 1938, p. 98.

3/ Esch, op. cit., p. 30.

4/ Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 135, 138.



the Polish census of 1921, 1/ as well as the elections to the Sejm (Diet) in 1922. This course was influenced by the propaganda efforts of Dr. Petrushevich in Vienna, who received considerable financial support from Ukrainians in the United States. 2/

On the other hand, a small group of Ukrainians led by the Rev. Izydor Tverdokhlib supported the elections. After Tverdokhlib was assassinated, the five Ukrainian representatives elected from Eastern Galicia formed The Peasants' Club (Khliboroby), headed by the Rev. Mr. Ilkov. 3/ In a speech before the Sejm in 1923, Ilkov formally renounced all hopes of an independent Ukraine. 4/

The Polish government, in order to please public opinion abroad, also made a conciliatory gesture by enacting a law for autonomy for the three provinces of Lvov, Tarnopol, and Stanislaw. 5/ The Ukrainians did not get their promised autonomy, since the statute remained a dead letter; this fact served to produce continued restlessness and violence among the Ukrainians.

The question of a Ukrainian University of Lvov also inflamed the Ukrainian situation. In August 1919 the president of the existing university, which had been bilingual until 1914, announced that only Polish citizens who had served in the Polish Army and foreigners would be eligible for admission. This barred the young Ukrainians who had served in the Ukrainian Army. Thus the University of Lvov became a strictly Polish institution, in spite of the protests of the Ukrainians. The latter proceeded to

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1/ Revyuk, Polish Atrocities in Ukraine, p. 488.

2/ Kutschabsky, W., "Die ukrainische politische Emigration," Osteuropa, May 1930, p. 542.

3/ Dziesieciolecie Polski Odrodzonej.

4/ Felinski, M., Ukraincy w Polsce Odrodzone (The Ukrainians in the Polish Renaissance), Warsaw, 1931, p. 34.

5/ Barr, James, and Davies, Rhys, Report on the Polish-Ukrainian Conflict in Eastern Galicia, Chicago, 1931, p. 3.

organize university courses in secret, which, in spite of searches and arrests by the Poles, endured until 1925. 1/ Some of the young Ukrainians went to Vienna, where a Ukrainian private university was established in 1921; in 1922 this school transferred to Prague. In addition, there was a Ukrainian Academy of Arts, as well as an Agricultural Academy, in Czechoslovakia. 2/

The attempt of the Polish Minister of Education to pacify the Ukrainians by a solemn pledge that on 1 January 1921 a Ukrainian university would be established at Stanislaw remained a dead letter. Consequently, Ukrainian dissatisfaction mounted and on 26 September 1921 a former Ukrainian Army officer threw a bomb at Marshal Pilsudski and Governor Grabowski at Lvov. 3/ This incident obviously did not improve relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Like the Russians, the Poles regarded Ukrainian nationalism as an artificial development fostered by Ukrainian intellectuals and intriguing foreign powers. Two Polish writers, the Rev. Wincenty Lutoslawski, a politician, and Professor Romer, state that "the Rutheno-Ukrainian movement was started, like Bolshevism, with German money and under German influence." 4/

On 15 March 1923 the Polish position in Eastern Galicia was greatly strengthened by the decision of the Allied Council of Ambassadors to recognize the eastern frontiers of Poland fixed in the Treaty of Riga. 5/ Although the Poles were obligated to respect the minority rights of the Ukrainians, the latter felt the decision was a great blow. Petrushevich now turned from the Allies toward Soviet Russia, and entered into negotiations with the Soviets, as a result of which many Ukrainian political

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1/ Mudryj, Wasyl, Borotha za ohnyszczu ukrainskoj kultury, op. cit., pp. 77-89.

2/ Kutschabsky, op. cit., pp. 550-551.

3/ Mudryj, op. cit., pp. 85 and 98.

4/ Lutoslawski, W., and Romer, E., The Ruthenian Question in Galicia, Paris, 1920, p. 13.

5/ Halecki, Oskar, "Polish-Russian Relations," The Review of Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 332.

refugees entered the USSR, and large numbers of Ukrainians began to pin their hopes on the Soviet Union. 1/

The Ukrainians did not fare well during the years of boycott and hostility towards the Poles. In 1924 the Sejm passed an act providing for three types of schools where the population was mixed: purely Polish, purely Ukrainian, and bilingual schools. The Ukrainians regarded this as a long step toward Polonization of the Ukrainian schools. According to Dr. Tselevich (Celewycz), of the UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union), the most powerful Ukrainian party, there were in 1926 917 Ukrainian primary schools in Eastern Galicia, 2,347 Polish schools, and 1,726 bilingual schools, compared to the 2,496 Ukrainian primary schools in the area under Austrian rule. In 1926-1927 there were only 855 Ukrainian schools, while by the next year the number had fallen to 700. Volhynia had 1,144 elementary schools, of which 4 were purely Ukrainian, 750 were Polish, and 350 bilingual. The Ukrainian professional and higher schools fared similarly; even in private Ukrainian schools, history and geography had to be taught in Polish. 2/

The Ukrainians combatted this Kulturkampf by organizing private Ukrainian schools, in which two cultural organizations, Ridna Shkola (The National School) and Prosvita (Enlightenment), played a leading role. American Ukrainians supported both of these organizations. 3/

In view of this tense atmosphere, it is no wonder that feelings ran high when President Wojciechowski of Poland visited Lvov in 1925. When a young Ukrainian attempted to assassinate him, the local police, apparently seeking to divert the attention of the Ukrainians by arousing their anti-Semitic feeling, charged that a Jewish student was guilty of the crime. This incident led to a Lvov "Dreyfus Case," which ended with the release of the innocent man after a year's imprisonment.

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1/ Felinski, op. cit., p. 40.

2/ Celewycz, Wolodymir, "Kulturpolitik der Polen gegenueber den Ukrainern," Nation und Staat, September 1928, pp. 939-940.

3/ Ibid., p. 941.



At the time of Pilsudski's coup d'etat in May 1926, it may be observed, hostility and tension prevailed in Eastern Galicia.

2. 1926-1930. For a time the Ukrainians had high hopes that Pilsudski would take positive action regarding the pressing problem of land reform. The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia had small insufficient farms, while the old Polish aristocracy possessed large estates. In Volhynia, for example, 550 landowners had some 550,000 hectares, while more than 1,000,000 peasants had only 1,500,000 hectares of arable land. In Volhynia there were 65 persons engaged in agriculture for each square kilometer, and in Galicia, 96; in France and Germany the corresponding figures were 13.5 and 33, respectively. 1/

In 1919 Pilsudski had promised agrarian reforms, and a law had been passed, but the result of this action was very small. Eventually, a new agrarian law was passed on 28 December 1925. 2/ However, while these reforms affected some 10-15 percent of the Polish peasants, they did little for the Ukrainians. Moreover, in order to weaken the influence of the Ukrainians the Polish government permitted Professor Grabski to colonize the Ukrainian territories with Polish settlers. 3/ Approximately 160,000 hectares were sold to the Polish colonists, and only 10,000 to the Ukrainians. Many of the settlers, who had been Polish soldiers or policemen, received their land in return for services, and also were granted liberal credit and other aid. By 1929 some 3,251 families of military colonists had been settled in Volhynia, in addition to the following civilian colonists: 4/

|           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| Volhynia  | 2,853 |
| Lvov      | 1,830 |
| Stanislav | 1,406 |
| Tarnopol  | 3,907 |

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1/ Rappaport, Jakob, "Die historischen und soziologischen Grundlagen der ukrainischen Frage in Polen," Nation und Staat, April 1929, p. 455; Revyuk, op. cit., p. 495-496.

2/ "The Polish Agrarian Reform," Polish Fortnightly Review, 15 March 1944, p. 3; Revyuk, op. cit., p. 493.

3/ Barr and Davies, op. cit., p. 12.

4/ Revyuk, op. cit., pp. 495-501.

The colonization was most intense in Volhynia, along the Soviet border, where the Poles wanted to set up a Polish middle and peasant class in addition to the existing nobility. The Polish agrarian policy produced deep unrest among the Ukrainians, and led to riots and permanent hostility.

In the meantime the Ukrainian intelligentsia, barred from government posts in spite of their educational qualifications, had entered the existing cooperatives, and made them outstanding. The four main groups of cooperatives, in the fields of credit, butter, miscellaneous products, and consumers' goods, were grouped in the Auditing Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives (Revizyny Soyuz Ukrainiskikh Kooperativ, or RSUK). This development helped considerably to unify the Ukrainians. 1/

In 1925 a new and powerful political factor appeared on the scene with the appearance of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDO), a revival of the prewar party of that name. Although the Party hoped for an independent Ukrainian state some time in the future, its immediate aim was autonomy for the Ukrainian territories within the Polish state. 2/

For a time in 1926 it appeared that the Poles and the Ukrainians might become reconciled. Count Dunin-Borkowski, Governor of the Province of Lvov, and his successor, Count Goluchowski, favored a conciliatory policy toward the Ukrainians; Borkowski especially tried hard to bring the two peoples together. Unfortunately he could offer no positive concessions, but confined his efforts to changing the hostile attitude of the Polish administration toward the minorities.

The Ukrainian nationalists refused to accept these gestures, for by this time they were hearing reports of a flourishing, independent Communist Ukraine across the Soviet frontier. The intelligentsia of the UNDO, to say nothing of the pro-Soviet Sel-Rob (explained in Section E below), were attracted by the "Ukrainization" of the Soviet Ukraine. There is evidence that the UNDO entered into discussions with the Communists at Vienna and Danzig in 1926-1927. 3/ The Ukrainians succeeded in electing a

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1/ "The Polish Cooperative Movement," Polish Fortnightly Review, 15 October 1943, p. 7; Felinski, M., op. cit., p. 90; Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

2/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 64; Felinski, op. cit., p. 53.

3/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1936, No. 1-2, p. 76.



number of representatives to the Sejm in 1928, where the UNDO delegates in particular, led by Dr. Levitski, took a much more prominent part than had Ilkov's followers.

The Poles continued their aggressive policy, and the Ukrainians met them with countermeasures. When in 1928 the Poles condemned to death two assassins of Sobinski, head of the Board of Education in Lvov, the Ukrainians in America responded with protests, rallies, memoranda to the League of Nations, and similar activities. 1/ Early in 1930 the nationalistic feelings of the Ukrainians reached a high pitch, with many instances of arson committed by the peasants. The movement of the peasants against the large Polish landowners was supported by the terrorists of the UVO (Ukrainian Militant Organization, discussed below), and possibly by the Communists. The Poles answered with reprisals.

3. 1930-1934. In 1930 the world began to hear numerous tales of a Polish reign of terror in Eastern Galicia conducted by the police and the Army. Wholesale floggings, frequently causing death; mass arrests of Ukrainian youths; destruction of homes, cooperatives, libraries, and banks; and confiscation of newspapers -- these were the forms of the drastic "pacification" with which the Poles answered the Ukrainian riots and sabotage. 2/ Finally, Dr. Levitski, leader of the UNDO, was arrested in October 1930, accused of giving financial support to the terrorist movement. 3/

After petitions had been submitted to the League of Nations in the fall of 1930 by Dr. Paneyko, Ukrainian propagandist in Geneva, the League took cognizance of the "pacification." Representatives of the UNDO also sent petitions to Geneva, and two Ukrainians presented petitions in person. 4/

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1/ Jary, Riko, "Die ukrainische Emigration in Amerika und ihre Bedeutung für die Heimat," Nation und Staat, October 1928, p. 37. The author was a leading Ukrainian terrorist.

2/ Barr, James, and Davies, Rhys, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

3/ Revyuk, op. cit., p. 191.

4/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1931, p. 271.



In Europe and America protests mounted. The problem was brought up in the House of Commons, where the report of the Rev. James Barr and Rhys Davies, cited above, was debated. Davies, an MP, felt that unrest in Eastern Galicia was caused by the fact that the promise of Ukrainian autonomy had not been carried out. 1/ This view was supported by Alexander Bochenski, a well-known Polish publicist, who in 1930 wrote in the conservative Czas (The Hour): "There was every reason to expect the relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians to be improved, if the various Polish promises had been honestly carried out." 2/

For a time, it appeared as if a compromise might be reached. An ardent advocate of Ukrainian-Polish understanding appeared in the person of Tadeusz Holowko, a Pole. He opposed attempts to assimilate the Ukrainians, proposing instead that they be given wide territorial autonomy in Eastern Galicia, where they should not be treated with enmity and contempt by the Poles, but should enjoy the status of co-rulers. The old policy, he held, led to rioting by the Ukrainians, with the inevitable "pacification." 3/

In March 1931 Holowko attempted to persuade two representatives of the UNDO that the Ukrainians should withdraw their petitions from the League of Nations. The Ukrainians, however, were becoming increasingly impatient, and expected a favorable decision from the League in September. The terrorist UVO, headed by Evhen Konovalets, denounced the UNDO for wishing to compromise, alleging that the League would not help the Ukrainians, and that the affair would be regarded as an internal affair of Poland. 4/

Late in August 1931, Holowko was assassinated. This event doubtless impaired the Ukrainian cause in the eyes of the world.

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1/ Barr and Davies, op. cit., p. 4.

2/ Revyuk, op. cit.

3/ Paprocki, S., "S. p. Tadeusz Holowko wobec problemow narodowosciowych" (Tadeusz Holowko and the nationality problems), Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1931, pp. 381-397.

4/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1931, pp. 268 and 271.

When the Japanese delegate, Shintaro Sato, as rapporteur for the League, presented his report on the "pacification," the League unanimously rejected the Ukrainian petition. 1/ The Ukrainians were now thoroughly disillusioned respecting the League. And when in September 1934 Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, repudiated the international minority obligations incumbent upon Poland, the Ukrainians were not surprised when there were no effective steps taken by the League. Dr. Levitsky declared that the Ukrainians should not be taken aback, as the League had never shown any interest in the cause of the minorities wronged by the Treaty of Versailles. 2/

Indeed, the years 1930-1934 were a period of general disillusionment for the Ukrainian nationalists, including those who had placed their hopes in the USSR. By 1930 the Soviet leaders had become thoroughly alarmed over the strength of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The institutions of the Soviet Ukraine, including the press, the schools, the cooperatives, and even the local Communist Party, had become Ukrainian first, and Communist only in name. In 1930 the discovery of secret Ukrainian organizations for the overthrow of Soviet rule was reported, and a great purge of Ukrainian intellectuals began. The discovery of other illegal organizations was announced in 1931 and 1933. Kossior, Ukrainian Communist leader, officially announced that "numerous Ukrainian Communists have been Ukrainian nationalists in disguise, or nationalists first and Communists afterward.... They have even been in contact with the UNO of Konovalets. Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger." A number of prominent Ukrainians were executed, including Kotsiubinsky, Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars. The nationalist writer Khvylovy, and Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education, who was summoned to Moscow for an accounting, both committed suicide in 1933. 3/ In addition, during this period the collectivization of Ukrainian agriculture was in full swing, accompanied by peasant disorders, sabotage, and slaughter of livestock. Hunger gripped the Ukraine.

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1/ Hodann, Max, Der slawische Gürtel um Deutschland, Berlin, 1932, p.186.

2/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1934, No. 5-6, p. 591.

3/ Bregy, Pierre, and Obolensky, Serge, The Ukraine -- A Russian Land, London, 1940, p. 212; Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 54-59.



Under these circumstances the Ukrainians in Poland lost all hope of a Soviet solution of their problem, and the intelligentsia renounced the idea of uniting the whole Ukraine under Soviet rule. In Eastern Galicia and Volhynia the situation also appeared hopeless, for Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Interior, continued his policy of reprisals, which he justified in the Sejm by referring to the terrorism of the Ukrainians. 1/ The latter continued their campaign of terror, and in the summer of 1934 assassinated Pieracki and the principal of a high school at Lvov. 2/

These acts caused a revulsion of feeling among the Ukrainians. Dr. Levitski, leader of the UNDO, on several occasions expressed to the Sejm his party's disapproval of such methods. Furthermore, Metropolitan Sheptitsky issued a pastoral letter condemning the terrorists, saying that "who so demoralizes the young is a criminal and an enemy of his nation." 3/ As a result of this combination of circumstances, a considerable part of the UNDO abandoned its tactics of implacable opposition to Poland, and manifested a more conciliatory attitude toward the Polish government. The Polish-German non-aggression pact of January 1934 helped to change the orientation of the Ukrainian nationalists.

4. 1934-1939. The interest of Hitler and his henchman Alfred Rosenberg in the Ukraine is well known. Even before coming to power, the Nazis had set up a special "Ukrainian Department," which attracted Hetman Skoropadsky and the followers of Petlura. The Ukrainian Department made an alliance with the reactionary Konovalets, leader of the terrorists of the UVO and the OUN (see Section E, below). Konovalets came into close contact with Hitler. 4/ The Nazi aim was to paralyze Poland and the little

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1/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1933, No. 6, p. 685.

2/ Ibid., 1934, pp. 430-433.

3/ Ibid.; also pp. 58-59.

4/ Murphy, Raymond E., and others, National Socialism, Washington, 1943, pp. 93-94; Henri, Ernst (pseud.), Hitler Over Europe? New York, 1934, pp. 167-171. Hodann, op. cit., p. 187.



Entente by encouraging the insurgent movement in Eastern Galicia, thus preparing the ground for a "Greater Ukrainian state" under Germany's protection, which was to serve as an ally on the German flank. 1/

Although the alliance between the pro-German Skoropadsky and the anti-Polish Konovalts was at first against both Poland and the USSR, they allegedly made contact with the pro-Polish Ukrainian group, the UNR (Ukrainian People's Republic). Levitski, president of UNR, was said to be a close friend of Beck, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and of Prince Sapieha, who had estates in the western Ukraine. 2/ Levitski, successor to the defunct Petlura, adhered to the latter's pro-Polish policy in hopes that Poland would conquer the Soviet Ukraine from the USSR. 3/

When the Polish-German non-aggression pact was signed in January 1934, there was widespread belief that it contained secret clauses defining the division of the spoils that would be obtained in the Soviet Ukraine. 4/ At Basel in November 1936, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the head of the Reichsbank, spoke semi-openly of the division of the Ukraine between Poland and Germany as a thing both natural and imminent. 5/ It is alleged that one result of this Polish-German rapprochement was that the Germans brought pressure to bear on Konovalts of the UVO and the OUN to cease attacking the Poles, and to turn his attention to the Soviet Union. 6/

It is difficult to determine how much the Polish-German pact influenced the Ukrainian nationalists to compromise with the Poles; there is no doubt, however, that the disillusionment with

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1/ Henri, op. cit., p. 202.

2/ Henri, Ernst (pseud.) Hitler Over Russia? London, 1936, pp. 165-166.

3/ Kutschabsky, W., "Die ukrainische politische Emigration," Osteuropa, May 1930, p. 539.

4/ Lawton, Lancelot, "The Oppressed Ukrainians," The Fortnightly Review, London, April 1934, p. 463.

5/ Bregy and Obolensky, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

6/ Henri, Hitler Over Russia? pp. 159-167; Hodann, op. cit., p. 187.

the Ukrainian policy of the USSR, and the failure of the opposition policy of the UNDO, helped to produce this result. During 1935 conversations to this end occurred between the UNDO and Prime Minister Koscialkowski, and an understanding was reached. As a result of the compromise, in the elections of 1935 the Ukrainians won 16 seats in the Sejm and 3 seats in the Senate. 1/ As the new Polish electoral law had eliminated almost all of the opposition parties, the Ukrainians were the only "independent" group in the Sejm. Wasyl Mudrij, editor of Dilo (The Cause), the largest Ukrainian daily, was elected Vice Marshal of the Sejm. The Ukrainian politicians who had thus gained place under the Poles declared their full loyalty to the government, voting for the budget and the military credits, on the grounds that the Ukrainian population needed a strong Polish army to protect them from the "extermination policy" of the Soviets. 2/

The mass of the Ukrainians derived little benefit from the compromise. In 1936 there were more mass trials of alleged members of the OUN, and the Polish authorities continued to harass the Ukrainians by closing many of their political, economic, cultural, and athletic organizations and by inaugurating a new period of "pacification" lasting throughout 1937. 3/ As a result, Ukrainian antagonism was again stimulated. A new political group of fascist character appeared, led by Dimitro Paliyiv, whose group had seceded from the UNDO in 1933, because the UNDO was allegedly too prone to compromise with the Poles. Now Paliyiv's party, the FNJ (Front Natsionalnoi Yednosti), declared that the UNDO had betrayed the national interests of the Ukrainians. 4/ Paliyiv's agitation was helped considerably by the Poles, who also started a movement against the compromise, proclaiming that "the Ukrainians suppress the Poles and the government helps them." There followed a growing wave of colonization of Polish settlers in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, while the Poles demanded that Ukrainians who wanted to buy land should renounce their nationality and their

1/ Osteuropa, October 1936, p. 36.

2/ Doroshenko, D., A History of the Ukraine, p. 650.

3/ Hrushevsky, M., A History of Ukraine, p. 570.

4/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 65.

religion. The increasing resentment of the Ukrainians forced even the loyal deputies of the UNDO to refuse to vote on the budget in February 1938. 1/

During 1938 Polish-Ukrainian relations grew worse rather than better. Several Polish deputies carried on a systematic campaign in the Sejm against the Greek Catholic Church and Metropolitan Sheptitsky. Even though they were non-political, leading organizations like the Soyuz Ukrainok (League of Ukrainian Women) were closed by the authorities. 2/

Up to 1938 the Poles had been quite successful in preventing the rise of Ukrainian nationalism in Volhynia along lines similar to what happened in Eastern Galicia. Governor Jozewski of Volhynia, who believed in Pilsudski's federative program, tried to win the loyalty of the Volhynians by granting cultural and economic concessions as well as aiding the Ukrainization of the Orthodox Church. He also banned nationalist newspapers coming from Lvov, such as Dilo, and had his secret police bar Eastern Galician intelligentsia, especially teachers. 3/ Jozewski, a former follower of Petlura, gave attractive jobs to many of Petlura's former ministers, apparently with the aim of making Volhynia a springboard for an attack on the Soviet Ukraine. For a time he had considerable success in keeping the Volhynians loyal to Poland. 4/ In May 1938, however, he was removed from office, which indicated that the Poles were following a definite anti-Ukrainian policy. 5/

By 1936 Communism was spreading in Volhynia, fostered by the Polish refusal to sell to the natives any substantial amount of land parcelled out from the great estates. 6/ The poverty in

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1/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, No. 1-2, 1938, pp. 100-101.

2/ Ibid., pp. 98 and 286.

3/ Ibid., p. 98.

4/ Ibid., p. 720.

5/ Osteuropa, August-September, 1938, pp. 767-768.

6/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1936, p. 257.



Volhynia was even greater in Galicia, as the people were more backward than the Galician Ukrainians. In 1937 some 25 percent of the Volhynians were said to lack sufficient bread and fuel. 1/ The Volhynians were also greatly aroused by the destruction of 114 Orthodox Churches in Volhynia and Polesie, and the closing of 300 others. The Poles justified this step on the basis of a Concordat of June 1938, which gave Poland the right to confiscate churches that the Tsars had forcibly changed from Catholic to Orthodox. 2/ Whatever the legality of the Polish action, the Volhynians regarded it as an attempt to Polonize them by striking at their religion.

The Munich settlement in 1938 agitated the western Ukrainians anew. In November a large part of Carpatho-Ukraine, which had received autonomy, was turned over to Hungary; the Poles acquiesced in this dismemberment, as they apparently wished to wipe out any centers of Ukrainian independence. 3/ Even the tiny remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine was swallowed by Hungary in March 1939. 4/

After Munich the Poles continued to suppress manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism. Public demonstrations in behalf of the Carpatho-Ukrainians led to a new "pacification," against which the Greek Catholic diocese protested. 5/ In December 1938 and again in early 1939, UNDO deputies introduced a bill in the Sejm for creating a separate Galician-Volhynian autonomous state, but the Sejm refused even to permit the bill to be entered on its calendar. 6/

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1/ Allen, W. E. D., op. cit., p. 379.

2/ Ubrich, Richard, "Die Nationalitaetenfrage in Polen," Nation und Staat, July-August, 1939, p. 650.

3/ Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine, p. 571; Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 69.

4/ Ibid.

5/ Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 572.

6/ Ibid., p. 573.

The conflict between Poland and Germany in 1939 caused an apparent cessation of the Polish Ukrainian conflict: shortly before the outbreak of the war the UNDO issued a declaration pledging loyalty to the Polish cause in the event of war. The UNDO delegation in the Sejm adopted a similar resolution on 2 September 1939. 1/ It should be borne in mind, however, that this party had for several years followed a policy of cooperation with the Polish government. In spite of this manifestation of loyalty, the hostility of many of the Ukrainians toward the Poles remained unabated.

D. The Jews of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia

The considerable Jewish minority of the four provinces occupied an unfortunate position. More than 75 percent of the Jewish population lived in cities, and only a small number were engaged in agriculture. Industry and handicrafts had become the principal occupation by the census of 1931, with commerce second. A fairly large number of Jews belonged to various professions; Jewish lawyers were numerous, although their inability to obtain government positions compelled them to compete fiercely for clients. 2/

With the exception of the small minority who joined or sympathized with the Communist Party, the Jews of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, like the other Jews of Poland, accepted the Polish government and supported it. They sought a way out from their difficult position along lines that were not subversive. The Orthodox group emphasized Jewish religious life, and cooperated with the Pilsudski government. Zionism had a great appeal for many of the younger, middle-class and professional people. Enjoying popularity among the laboring groups was the Bund, a Socialist group affiliated with the Second International, strongly anti-Communist in outlook. The Bund sought a more democratic regime in Poland.

Until the death of Pilsudski, the anti-Semitism endemic in Poland and especially in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia was kept

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1/ Lwow and Southeastern Poland, Polish Government-in-Exile.

2/ American Jewish Committee, The Jews of Poland. All data for this section have been obtained from this source.

in check; from 1936 to 1939, however, the position of the Eastern Galician and Volhynian Jews deteriorated rapidly. It was difficult for their children to enter secondary schools, and the number of Jewish university students in Poland declined rapidly from 8,425 in 1933-1934 to 4,113 in 1938-1939, although the total number of university students increased slightly in this period. Throughout Poland Jews found it increasingly difficult to obtain positions in government-owned industries, schools, the civil service, and the like. In 1936 an economic boycott of the Jews was approved by Premier Skladkowski and by a pastoral letter of Cardinal Hlond; the following year the boycott became part of the program of the Camp of National Unity of Smigly-Ridz. This boycott had the effect of driving many Jews out of business into the already swollen ranks of the laboring class.

The encouragement officially given to anti-Semitism also took shape in anti-Jewish riots. Apparently the government was quite willing to have the general dissatisfaction of the Polish nationalists turned on the Jewish scapegoat. The Ukrainian nationalists of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, who, as indicated in Section E below, had come strongly under the influence of Germany, were also quite ready to vent their spleen on the Jews who allegedly prevented Ukrainian intellectuals from securing favorable positions. Thus when the Polish-German war broke out, the position of the Eastern Galician and Volhynian Jews was far from enviable, faced as they were by a hostile Polish government, the bitter enmity of the Ukrainian nationalists, and the danger of extermination at the hands of Nazi Germany.

E. Political Parties of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia

1. The Conservative Parties. The Hetman Party consisted chiefly of very conservative emigres from the Soviet Ukraine, although it had adherents in Eastern Galicia. The leading figures were Skoropadsky, whose role in 1918 has been described, and the historian Lipinsky. Its program was a dictatorship in the Ukraine, and the return of the landowners to their possessions. Its headquarters were in Berlin. It had little popular following. 1/

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1/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 62; Kutschabsky, op. cit., p. 545.



Views somewhat similar to those of the Hetman Party were held by the Ukrainska Narodnya Obnova (Ukrainian National Renaissance), a Catholic organization under the influence of Bishop Khomyshyn, Greek Catholic bishop of Stanislavov. It stood for absolute loyalty to the Polish state, but asked for an autonomous Ukrainian area. The influence of this party was weak. 1/

The Volynske Ukrainske Obyednanye (Volhyhian Ukrainian Union) followed a policy of loyal cooperation with the Polish government, and fought "anarchistic elements." The Ukrainization of the Orthodox diocese of Volhynia was a result of the efforts of this organization. This party was headed by several senators and deputies to the Sejm. 2/

The above party was quite similar to the Ukrainski Narodny Soyuz (Ukrainian National League), whose chief strength was in the province of Stanislav. Like the Khliboroby of Tverdokhlib and Ilkov, it stood for cultural autonomy under the Polish state. 3/

2. Moderate Nationalist Parties. The Ukrainske Nationalno-Demokratychnye Obyednanye (UNDO) was the most powerful Ukrainian party in Poland. While its maximum program was the union of all Ukrainian territories in one independent state, its immediate and practical program was a separate autonomous Ukrainian region within the Polish republic. The Party's strength was concentrated in Eastern Galicia; its organ, Dilo (The Cause), was the chief newspaper of Lvov. The UNDO was headed by Dr. Levitsky and a number of other Sejm deputies. It had strong influence over a number of social, community, economic, and cultural organizations. 4/ The Ukrainski Katolichky Soyuz (Ukrainian Catholic Union), founded in 1931 by Metropolitan Sheptitsky, had no separate program, but cooperated with the UNDO. 5/ The Ukrainska Selanska (Ukrainian Peasant Party) sought to represent the political views of the

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1/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 63.

2/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1931, p. 451; ibid., 1936, p. 622; Felinski, op. cit., p. 78; Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

3/ Faber, Hans, "Die ukrainischen Parteien in Polen," Nation und Staat, July-August, 1928, p. 870.

4/ Felinski, op. cit., p. 78; Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

5/ Paprocki, op. cit., p. 63.

Ukrainian peasantry and to guard their special interests. Its influence was slight.

3. Fascist Groups. The Front Natsionalnoi Yednosty (Front of National Unity) was a fascist party which was formed by a group seceding from the UNDO after the latter adopted a policy of abject compromise with the Poles. Its membership consisted of the more extreme elements of the UNDO and those nationalists who wanted to undertake a strong constructive program, instead of the terrorism of the UVO and the OUN. The leader of the FNY was the journalist Paliyiv. 1/

The Ukrainian Militant Organization (UVO) with headquarters in Berlin, was headed by Col. Evhen Konovalets, a former Austrian army officer from Lvov who organized Ukrainians taken prisoner by the Russians into a "Galician-Bukovinian Corps," with which he supported the Rada at Kiev in 1917. Under Petlura he took part in the invasion of Kiev in 1918. He carried on terrorism against Poland until 1935, when he turned his attentions to the USSR. His objective in fighting Poland was to inflame Ukrainian-Polish relations in Galicia to the point where Poland would abandon the three Eastern Galician provinces. The UVO had no ideological support, and hence had little following. As a result, in 1929 he organized the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), with its center in Prague. It advocated a dictatorship to free the Ukraine, and separation of Church and State. It attracted large numbers of the young Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia, and received generous financial support from the Ukrainians of the United States and Canada. The OUN had strong connections with Berlin, and branches in many other European capitals. It employed the same terrorist methods as the UVO, at first against Poland, and from 1935 on, against the USSR. The assassination of Konovalets in Rotterdam in 1938, allegedly because of his anti-Soviet policy, did not lessen the activities of the OUN. His chief assistant was Major Riko Yary in Berlin. 2/

4. Parties of the Left. The Ukrainska Sotsialistichno-Radikalna Partiya (Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party), or USRP, was formed in 1926 by the merger of emigre Socialist revolutionaries

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1/ Ibid., p. 65.

2/ Felinski, op. cit., p. 129; Kutschabsky, op. cit., p. 547; Koch, Hans, "Ukrainische Verlústiste," Osteuropa, August-September, 1938, pp. 787, 788.



from Russia and the Ukrainian Radical Party of prewar times. It aimed at a Ukrainian Workers' Republic, and was in theory uncompromising toward the Polish government. Its chief strength was in the province of Stanislaw. 1/

The Ukrainska Sotsial-Demokratichna Partiya (Ukrainian Social Democratic Party), formed in 1928, was a right-wing Socialist Party of the Second International. It worked together with the Polish Socialist Party, concentrating on the Ukrainian urban working classes. 2/

The Ukrainian Labor Party (Ukrainska Partiya Pratsy, or UPP) was founded in 1927 from the left-wing of the UNDO which was sympathetic to Soviet Russia. It disbanded voluntarily as a result of general disillusionment with the developments in the Soviet Ukraine in the early 1930's. 3/

The chief party of the left was the Ukrainskie Selansko-Robitniche-Sotsialistichne Obednanie (Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers' Socialist Organization) or Sel-Rob. This was founded in 1926 by merging the Eastern Galician Partiya Narodnoi Voli (Party of the Will of the People) and the Selsoyuz (Peasant Union). The former group agreed to adopt a nationalist viewpoint instead of its former internationalism, while the Selsoyuz agreed to stress a policy of social emancipation above the national problem. The differences of outlook remained, however, and in 1927 the party split into Sel-Rob Pravitsiya (Right Wing) and Sel-Rob Levitsiya (Left Wing). The former, which adopted a nationalist, anti-Moscow attitude, was strongly opposed by the Communists, whose support enabled the left-wing group, which became known as Sel-Rob Union, to extend its influence over Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. Sel-Rob Pravitsiya disbanded in December 1928. 4/

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1/ Felinski, op. cit., p. 57; Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 66-67; Faber, op. cit., p. 869; Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1932, pp. 664-665.

2/ Felinski, op. cit.; Paprocki, op. cit., pp. 67-68; Faber, op. cit., p. 871.

3/ Felinski, op. cit., p. 57; Paprocki, op. cit., p. 71; Faber, op. cit., p. 869.

4/ Sprawy Narodowosciowe, 1933, pp. 664-665; Faber, op. cit., p. 869; Felinski, op. cit., p. 57.



Sel-Rob Union was the most important pro-Soviet party. In power and influence it was exceeded only by UNDO and the USRP. UNDO and Sel-Rob waged a bitter contest for popular support; in order to weaken the influence of the latter group, UNDO closed its local social and educational organizations in which Sel-Rob was strong. In spite of this, in the elections of 1928 Sel-Rob obtained six seats in the Sejm and one in the Senate. In the 1930 elections, however, the Sel-Rob Union candidates were disqualified on technical grounds. 1/

From 1928 on, the influence of Sel-Rob Union among the Ukrainian peasants increased greatly, because of its emphasis on their economic problems. This success, however, led to punitive action by the Polish government. When in 1931 the poverty-stricken peasants revolted in several places, the Poles arrested several of the Sel-Rob Union members and tried them on charges of being Communist spies. Numbers of Ukrainian peasants were arrested on charges of being Communists, and one was hanged as a "Communist spy." 2/

After the Communist Party had been declared illegal in 1931, the Polish government claimed that the Sel-Rob Union was a legal Communist agency, created to spread Communism among the Ukrainian masses. 3/ It was officially disbanded in 1932, although its activities were continued in a clandestine fashion.

The Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistichna Partiya Zakhidnoi Ukrainy), or KPZU, was a Ukrainian branch of the Third International. It aimed to bring about a social revolution in this area, and to incorporate it into Soviet Russia. It was unable to gain much direct influence among the Ukrainians, however, as its membership was not confined to Ukrainians, but included Jews and other minority groups. Secondly, the proletariat of the towns of Eastern Galicia, to which groups its appeal was strongest, were predominantly non-Ukrainian. Hence the Communist Party was forced to rely on the Sel-Rob Union, which succeeded in winning

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1/ Felinski, M., The Ukrainians in Poland, London, 1931, pp. 93-94, 98.

2/ Hodmann, op. cit., p. 133.

3/ Felinski, The Ukrainians in Poland, p. 153.

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large numbers of Ukrainians to policies close to those of the Communist Party. From 1931 on the Communists were forced to go underground, owing to the official ban on their party. <sup>1/</sup> Together with the Sel-Rob Union, they emerged from hiding when the Soviet troops occupied the area in 1939.

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<sup>1/</sup> Felinski, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

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### III. CONCLUSION

Thus, when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia formed a strongly disaffected area. With the exception of the considerable numbers of Polish colonists, many of whom had been induced to settle in this region to serve the political interests of the Polish government, most of the inhabitants disliked the Poles with varying degrees of intensity. Unfortunately, the non-Polish population was far from united in its desires. A large part of the Ukrainian intellectuals had become extremely nationalistic, and had absorbed German National Socialist propaganda; they were strongly anti-Semitic, extremely hostile to the USSR, and eager followers of the Nazi cult of violence and terror. The Jewish intellectuals and artisans, seeing no hope in the Poles nor in the Ukrainian nationalists, either attempted to escape attention by withdrawing into their private affairs, or in desperation looked for salvation either to Zionism or to the USSR. The Ukrainian peasants, steeped in misery, also were inclined to look to the east. Although their earlier hopes of a Soviet solution had been deceived, the Polish "pacification" had made them realize the hopelessness of fighting the Poles unaided. While some of the Ukrainian peasants, like the intellectuals, hoped for German aid against the Poles, probably larger numbers believed that the Soviet Ukraine was again flourishing, and that only by coming under Soviet control could their hopeless position be improved. The solution of the problem of the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia was to be either a German or a Soviet solution; the Poles had clearly failed in their attempts to integrate this region into the Polish Republic.

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